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Abstract 
 
How has the emergence of defined contribution pension plans, such as 401(k) plans, affected the 
financial security of future retirees?   We consider this question using a unique dataset of pension 
plan formulas for the Surveys of Consumer Finances in 1983 and 1989 and the characteristics of 
401(k) plans from the Surveys of Consumer Finances between 1989 and 2001.  Our simulations 
account for uncertainty in earnings and rates of return on stocks and bonds, ownership of 
company stock, uncertainty in earnings, and heterogeneity in asset choices, plan participation, 
and job tenure.  We find that in the mid-1990s, 401(k) plans were roughly equivalent to defined 
benefit plans from the 1980s, but by the later 1990s, 401(k) plans dominated defined benefit 
plans.  
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  I.  Introduction 
Two decades ago, most workers with pensions had a defined benefit (DB) plan.  The 
employer made necessary contributions and investments to meet promised pension benefit 
payments when the employee retired.  By 1993, the tide had turned; more than half of covered 
employees participated primarily in defined contribution (DC) pensions such as 401(k) plans 
(EBRI, 1997).  This dramatic shift was associated as well with growing concerns about the 
emerging 401(k) plans.  Some viewed 401(k) plans as a crisis waiting to happen when current 
generations, having made minimal (or no) contributions to their DC plan, retired with inadequate 
pension asset balances (Ferguson and Blackwell, 1995; Willette, 1995).  Another concern was 
that workers switching jobs would use the lump sum distributions for houses, boats, or other 
purchases rather than reinvesting them in another retirement account (Schultz, 1995; USDOL, 
1998b).  In a similar vein, newly retired workers may not roll over the assets into an annuity and 
therefore risk “spending down” their retirement wealth too early (e.g., Brown and Warshawsky, 
2001). 
 The most serious charge against 401(k) plans, however, has been the underlying 
uncertainty in rates of return, shown most recently by the unhappy experiences of Enron 
employees with 401(k) plans heavily laden with Enron stock.1    And even without company 
stock ownership programs, the more general criticism was that employees made uninformed 
investment decisions, or that stock market risk, even managed expertly, was inappropriate in any 
well-functioning pension plan (Ferguson and Blackwell, 1995).2    
Aside from anecdotal information, however, there is surprisingly little information about 
                                                 
1 This in turn has generated a barrage of unfavorable news articles (Quinn, 2002) and books with titles such as The 
Great 401(k) Hoax (Wolman and Colamosca, 2002). 
2 Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988) argue that, in addition, DB plans can reduce earnings uncertainty. 
 
 the adequacy of DC plans relative to the DB plans they have supplanted.3  Such comparisons 
have proved difficult to evaluate in the past because of the substantial heterogeneity in the 
provisions of DB and DC plans across different firms and in the contribution and investment 
decisions of workers in different DC plans.  Comparisons are further complicated by the 
continued evolution of both DB and DC plans during the past several decades.     
We address this question by comparing a representative sample of DB plans with a 
representative sample of 401(k) plans.  We use data from the Surveys of Consumer Finances 
from 1983 to 2001, and, in particular, the Pension Provider Surveys (PPS) that accompanied the 
1983 and 1989 SCFs.  Each PPS includes the detailed pension plan formulas for workers who 
report being covered by a pension in the SCF, thereby making it possible to examine the 
distribution of DB plans before (and during) the general transition over to DC plans.  We 
compare the distribution of DB pension entitlements from the PPS with the distributions of 
401(k) plan benefits in the SCFs from 1989 through 2001.  
We characterize the distribution of pension benefits by simulating a broad range of 
earnings paths, portfolio composition (including company-owned stock), and portfolio returns 
through the weighted samples of DB and DC plans.  Our main finding is that by 1995, the typical 
401(k) plan yielded roughly similar median benefits (and higher mean benefits) compared to 
defined benefits plans in 1983 and 1989, although the 10th percentile benefits were consistently 
lower.  A utility-based comparison of the distributions suggests that in 1995, individuals with 
risk aversion parameters between 2 and 6 (depending on the simulation) would have been 
indifferent between a randomly chosen 401(k) and a defined benefit plan from the 1980s.  By the 
end of the decade, however, 401(k) plans provided a distribution of expected retirement income 
                                                 
3 Holden and Vanderhei (2002b) are an important exception; they develop a 401(k) model of accumulation under 
uncertainty, but they do not compare the resulting returns to the universe of defined benefit plans. 
 
 that would be preferred by all but the most the risk averse consumers.  Our findings are not 
dependent on the extraordinary gains in equity markets during the 1990s because we exclude 
equity returns after 1990, a year in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average never closed above 
3000.   
Our basic results also extend to job spells in which workers leave the firm before 
retirement.  The concern that workers will spend rather than save their pre-retirement 
distributions from 401(k) plans is more than offset by the backloading of DB pension accruals, or 
the loss to employees in DB benefits that occurs when they leave prior to plan retirement ages.  
An important difference is that workers between jobs with 401(k) plans get to spend their 
pension balances on things that they want, rather than having the lost benefits remain with the 
DB plan sponsor.  In short, our results suggest that 401(k) plans are not the ticking time bomb 
that many fear.  We identify two factors that are critical, however, in the comparison of 401(k) 
with defined benefit plans: the small fraction of workers without any contributions to their 
401(k) plans, and burdensome administrative or operating expenses for 401(k) investments.   
II. Modeling the Distribution of DB and DC Pension Benefits  
Defined contribution plans have experienced rapid growth in the past two decades 
(VanDerhei and Copeland, 2001). During the early 1980s, DC plans appeared primarily as a way 
to supplement an existing DB plan. Over time, however, firms began to introduce DC plans as 
the primary pension plan, forsaking DB plans altogether, or at least in smaller firms, to 
terminating the DB plan and replacing it with a DC plan (Papke, 1995, 1999; Ippolito and 
Thompson, 2000).  Among workers covered by pension plans, the share with primary defined 
contribution plans, largely 401(k) plans, grew from 38 percent in 1992 to 57 percent in 1998 
(VanDerhei and Copeland, 2001).  
 
 The defining characteristic of a DB plan is that the firm promises to pay the worker a 
nominal annuity based on a set of formulas related to the worker’s age, years of service, and final 
average pay (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989).4  Final average pay may be the average of the last 
few years of earnings but is more often the average of the highest few years or the highest 
consecutive years during the last few years.  (The distinction matters when wages are stochastic 
or decline later in the work life.)  Many plans specify a replacement rate per year of service, but 
the replacement rate varies substantially across firms.5  Other plans pay a flat rate of benefits in 
dollar terms per year of service worked (Kotlikoff and Smith, 1983). 
Some DB plans are also integrated with Social Security to varying degrees, and most 
have more than one formula that can be operative for a given worker.  Finally, there are 
differences in how DB plans treat early retirement, both in terms of what is considered a 
“normal” retirement date and the extent to which benefits are reduced because of early 
retirement.6  Given the heterogeneity in the specific features of each DB plan, there is no way to 
accurately characterize the distribution of benefits without the full summary plan descriptions 
provided in a dataset such as the Pension Provider Survey. 
In contrast to DB plans, DC plans differ across firms along just two key dimensions.  The 
first is the total contribution rate.  Contributions may come from the employee, the employer, or 
both.  Some DC plans are non-contributory, so that the employer funds the entire pension.  
Others, such as many 401(k) plans, explicitly link the amount of the employer contributions to 
                                                 
4 Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1992) report that some firms gave ad hoc increases in pension benefits to account 
for inflation between 1983-1987.  The likelihood of receiving such ad hoc adjustments is not reflected in our 
calculations.  However, all pension plan formulas have been modified so that dollar amounts specified in nominal 
terms are indexed to nominal wage growth. 
5 For example, if the replacement rate is 1.5 percent per year of service and the number of years of service is 20, the 
replacement rate would be 30 percent of final average pay.  
6 For a discussion of how these incentives affect retirement, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Stock and Wise 
(1990), Samwick (1998), and Woodbury (2001). 
 
 the amount of the employee contributions through a “matching” provision, commonly ranging 
from $0.10 to $1.00 per dollar of employee contribution. The second dimension along which DC 
plans differ is the investment allocation.  Some plans subsidize (and actively encourage) the 
purchase of company stock, while others limit investments to an array of diversified stock and 
bond portfolios.   
 We employ two different approaches to comparing pension distributions.  The first 
approach is a counterfactual experiment.  In the counterfactual, we estimate benefits for the 
sample of workers covered by their actual pension plans in the PPS 1983 or 1989.  We then 
assign each worker a randomly chosen 401(k) plan from an SCF in the years 1989 through 2001.  
In both the DB and 401(k) scenarios, the realizations of earnings are identical for each worker, 
and workers are assumed to have worked at the firm from their date of hire until age 62.   
Our second approach to comparing pension plans is to use a hypothetical benchmark 
worker.  We endow the benchmark worker with the average characteristics (age, date of hire, 
earnings) of the PPS sample.  We calculate the benefits for the benchmark worker in each 
pension plan from the PPS assuming the worker is covered by the plan from age 31 to age 62.  
As in the counterfactual approach, we compare the distribution of benefits under the PPS plans 
and randomly assigned 401(k) plans.  There are three key differences between the approaches.  
The first is that the benchmark approach allows us to better compare the evolution of plan 
generosity over time—separately from changes in the characteristics of workers covered by these 
plans.  The second is that it allows the evaluations of pension benefits for hypothetical job 
changes.  And finally, it allows the ranking of the 401(k) and DB benefits in a utility framework 
with specified risk aversion parameters.  
In both approaches, we specify pension benefits for worker i as .   In this ),,(
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TryGB iiii =
 
 expression, T is the number of years of eligible service, is a 1xT vector of earnings for 
individual i, and  is a 1xT vector of returns that depends on the individual’s portfolio 
allocation as well as the rates of return on the underlying assets.  The function G
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i represents how 
the individual’s pension plan maps earnings, rates of return, and years of service into the pension 
benefit.  For ease of exposition, Gi  represents all of the plans for which a worker is eligible on 
his current job.  
 Clearly, both earnings and rates of return are stochastic, so each worker may face 
considerable uncertainty about his benefits at retirement.   The probability that worker i receives 
retirement benefits from his pension plan that are less than a given level B is written: 
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Suppose that the new 401(k) plan can be characterized by a new function Gi*, with 
benefits equal to  and corresponding distribution function F),,(
~~
** TryGB iiii = i*(B) as in (1).  
Since our objective is to compare the entire panoply of pension plans by vintage and type (actual 
plans in the PPS or 401(k) plans in later SCFs), our theoretical objective is to integrate over all 
plans in a given vintage and type to form an overall distribution function  with 
a similar expression for F
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where I is an indicator value that takes the value of one when the statement is true and zero 
otherwise, and S(πi) is the integer number of earnings and asset return simulations performed for 
each of the i workers, with S(πi) proportional to the sampling weight iπ .  In the empirical 
section, we present results for both the expected value of each distribution, and percentile values 
F-1(z) and F*-1(z) for the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles.   
Because we do not observe the entire history of earnings and asset returns, we specify the  
distribution of these variables.  We assume that the structure of the earnings process is given by:  
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where ln(yit) is the natural logarithm of earnings yit, which is assumed to follow a random walk 
with a quartic drift in age, represented by Xit.7   For computational simplicity, we ignore 
transitory shocks to earnings.8  The randomness in earnings is characterized by the T-1 vector of 
error terms {εit}.   We project earnings forward using these error terms (i.e., given earnings in 
year t, εit+1 yields yit+1), and project earnings back where appropriate using analogous error terms.       
Computing expected pension benefits requires, at a minimum, the evaluation of a T-1 
dimensional integral over all of the shocks to earnings.  Since it is not possible to evaluate the 
distribution function G analytically, we instead simulate the probability distribution of earnings 
                                                 
7 The age-related components of earnings growth were estimated from the March 1983 Current Population Survey 
by regressing the logarithm of annual earnings on age, age2, age3, and age4 for full-time, white male workers (see 
Murphy and Welch, 1990).   
8 Omitting transitory shocks will make DB plans appear to be less risky, as most of them calculate benefits based on 
a short average of earnings at the end of the working years where transitory shocks may play an important role.  
 
 through simulated “draws” of T-1 independent values of εit from N(0,σ2).  Together with the 
actual reported earnings in the survey year, we can construct the worker’s entire earnings history 
for each simulated draw in the counterfactual case.  (In the benchmark case, we begin each 
simulated earnings draw at the median earnings of the 31-year-old.)  
Estimating the benefits provided by 401(k) plans also requires us to specify a process 
governing asset returns.  The vector of returns  over the T years depends on the portfolio of 
assets held and the rates of return on each asset.   Suppose there are M different types of assets, 
with a 1xM vector of weights θ
~ri
i, which are assumed to be constant over time for a given worker; 
in other words, they are assumed to rebalance their portfolio to maintain the same asset share.   
The 1xT vector of returns  is written as a weighted average of the asset-specific returns,  = 
θ
~ri ~ri
i iρ~ .  Asset returns are sampled with replacement from historical rates of return.  
IV.  Data and Parameterization 
Our estimates of pension benefits are based on the household data in the Surveys of 
Consumer Finances (SCF) and the companion Pension Provider Surveys (PPS).  Conducted 
triennially since 1983 by the Federal Reserve Board, the SCFs are designed to provide a 
comprehensive survey of household wealth in the United States.  Each survey collects detailed 
information on income and wealth for both a representative cross-section of households and a 
special sample of high-income households identified from tax returns (Avery, et. al., 1984a,b).   
For every respondent or spouse in the 1983 and 1989 SCF samples who reported being covered 
by a pension, the PPS attempted to obtain the summary plan description for the plan from the 
pension provider, usually the employer.9   
                                                 
9 The original documentation for the PPS in Curtin (1987) contains template programs that convert the PPS data into 
formulas to compute benefit entitlements under each plan.   We have revised the original formulas to allow for 
individual-specific investment allocations, stochastic wage profiles, and stochastic investment returns.  
 
  One complication with our use of the 1989 Pension Provider Survey is that in 1989 
(unlike 1983), the SCF does not identify whether the worker is covered by Social Security in 
addition to pensions.  This creates the largest problem for state or local government employees 
whose pension plans may substitute for Social Security benefits.  To avoid potential bias, we 
remove public sector employees from our simulations both 1983 and 1989.10   
   There are 2,180 workers in the SCF 1983 and 1,587 workers in the SCF 1989 who 
report being covered by a pension (including those covered only by a 401(k)-type plan) at their 
current employers, representing 43.39 and 44.15 million workers, respectively.  Because many 
individuals may participate in the same plan, the total number of different plans used is 929 in 
1983 and 541 in 1989.  Approximately 74 and 71 percent of the workers reporting coverage had 
valid data on their plans in the PPS 1983 and 1989, respectively.   Workers for whom a pension 
plan is not found in the PPS are assigned a pension plan according to an imputation procedure 
described in Samwick and Skinner (1998). 
In DB plans, the annual benefit payment is typically specified in nominal terms and may 
change over time, such as providing an extra benefit in years before Social Security benefits are 
available.  We therefore calculate the actuarial present value of the benefits and convert this 
actuarial present value into a constant, real annuity beginning at the age of retirement.   For DC 
plans, we compute the constant, real annuity that could be supported by the balance in the 
account as of the retirement date.  For DC plans obtained from the PPS in 1983 or 1989, we use 
the plan formula to determine employer contributions and self-reported data to determine 
employee contributions and investment allocations.  For 401(k) plans in the various years of the 
SCF (spanning 1989 to 2001), we use self-reported data on the employer contributions as well.  
                                                 
10 Comparisons of 1983 DB pension benefits in the sample excluding workers who report that they are not covered 
by Social Security versus 1983 DB pension benefits in the sample excluding public sector employees show little 
 
 Table 1 describes samples of 401(k) plans from the SCFs in 1989 – 2001 to be randomly 
assigned to the workers as part of the counterfactual and benchmark scenarios.11  The number of 
workers with only a 401(k) plan rose substantially over this period, from 8.17 million in 1989 to 
27.75 million in 2001, with the largest change occurring between 1992 and 1995.12  Employee 
and total contribution rates increased over this period as well; by 2001 combined rates of 
contribution were 11.53 percent of earnings.   
Pension plans in the PPS that predict zero retirement benefits are excluded from our 
central simulations; these include DB plans that had been phased out or those with Social 
Security offset provisions that incorrectly assign zero benefits in some scenarios.   In the SCF 
household surveys, there are a small percentage of workers who claim to be covered only by a 
401(k) plan who nonetheless have no reported 401(k) contribution (by both the employer or 
employee); this percentage ranged from 2.7 to 4.7 percent depending on the year of the survey 
(see Table 1).    Given our assumption that the annual contribution is maintained throughout the 
worker’s employment, these workers would be predicted to end up without any pension.  It is 
highly unlikely, however,  that these workers would remain zero contributors their entire lives – 
since roughly three-quarters of these zero-contributors have 401(k) asset balances from prior 
contributions – but we will also present “lower bound” estimates under the assumption that 
workers will end up at retirement without any pension.14   
                                                                                                                                                             
difference.  We are grateful to Arthur Kennickell for suggesting this approach. 
11 The matched plans could actually be any type of tax-deferred savings plan; for simplicity, we refer to all such tax-
deferred saving plans as 401(k) plans in the text. 
12 Although the sampling frames are slightly different, the implied pension coverage and contribution rates are 
consistent with those from the CPS for the 1988 and 1993.  (See Samwick and Skinner, 1998, Appendix A.)   
14  Recall that all simulations exclude zero pension outcomes for defined benefit plans.  Excluding noncontributors 
could impart an upward bias by assuming that temporarily high contributors contribute that amount for the rest of 
their lives.   
 
  The SCFs between 1989 and 2001 report contribution and asset allocation information for 
up to four pension plans per worker.  For each of their three largest accounts, we assigned shares 
of equity in each 401(k) plan to 100, 0, and 50 percent, depending on whether respondents 
indicated that the account was invested “mostly or all in stock,” “mostly or all in interest earning 
assets,” or “split between these.”15   The proportion of the accounts invested mostly in stocks 
increased from 23.69 percent in 1989 to 54.54 in 2001.   
Individuals may hold a large part of their portfolio in company stock.16  Holden and 
VanDerhei (2002a) estimated that 42 percent of enrollees in 1996 were given the option to 
purchase company stock; of these, 65.5 percent held some company stock in their portfolio, with 
15.3 percent holding more than 90 percent.  We randomly assigned company stock ownership to 
match the overall distribution of company stock ownership in Holden and VanDerhei (2002a).17   
 With regard to rates of return, we use data from Siegel (1992, updated to 1990 by 
personal communication) for 1901-1990 for three broad categories of assets: short-term bonds, 
long-term bonds, and stocks.  For company stock, the fourth category of assets, rates of return 
are drawn from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database on individual stocks 
during 1926-1990, weighted in each year by relative asset value.  (In practice, we draw randomly 
from the distribution of real stock return, discretized into 0.5 percent segments.) To capture the 
probability of an Enron-style collapse, we convert the bottom 0.5 percent of company stock 
returns to bankruptcy (i.e., -100 percent returns). 
                                                 
15 Because this question was not asked in 1983, we randomly assigned the 1989 allocations to the 1983 DC plans 
where necessary.  The proceeds of the fourth account were assumed to be invested in the same proportions as the 
other three in our simulations.  All miscellaneous investment allocations were classified as “interest bearing.” In our 
parameterization of investment allocations, we assume that all “interest earning” assets are evenly divided between 
short-term and long-term bonds. 
16 See Holden and VanDerhei (2002a), Mitchell and Utkus (2002), and Liang and Weisbenner (2002).  We assume 
that earnings shocks are not correlated with asset returns (Davis and Willen, 2000). Unfortunately, company stock 
returns could not be matched to individual workers. 
 
 Average returns (10th and 90th percentiles) are 7.95 percent per year for equity (–6.12 
percent, 21.12 percent), 1.58 percent for long-term bonds (-4.51, 6.60), and 0.75 percent for 
short-term bonds (-1.23, 2.99).18 We imputed administrative load factors of 92, 71, and 42 basis 
points for equity, long-term bond, and short-term bond assets, respectively based on a report by 
the Investment Company Institute.19  This means that the average rate of return on short-term 
bonds, for example, is just 0.33 percent (0.75-0.42). In our basic simulations of earnings the 
worker is assumed fully employed until age 62, although in subsequent simulations, we allow the 
worker to switch jobs or retire early.  We set σ = 0.13 in equation (3), meaning that the standard 
deviation of the (permanent) innovation in log earnings is 13 percent per year.20   Economy-wide 
real earnings growth is assumed to be 1.5 percent annually, and both the real interest rate and the 
inflation rate are 3 percent. Finally, we simulate one earnings and asset draw for every 1,000 
workers in the sample population weights, for a total of 39,784 simulations for the 1983 data and 
40,203 for the 1989 data. 
V.  Empirical Results  
Counterfactual Comparisons 
We first consider the counterfactual, where individuals in DB plans are assigned 
randomly chosen 401(k) plans along with the corresponding asset allocation and contribution 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 For example, 6.5 percent (0.42 x 15.3 percent) of 401(k) enrollees hold 90-100 percent of their entire portfolio in 
company stock.  Midpoints of deciles (in this case 95 percent) were used in the numerical calculations.   
18 The mean return on individual (company) stock is higher because rates of return when these data were available 
(1926-90) were higher than the entire period 1900-1990.  
19 We base these load factors on average operating expenses in 1998, reported in ICI (2002).  The ICI report further 
adjusts administrative costs by “distribution costs,” to adjust for front-end costs of mutual funds.  However, their 
distribution costs are simply the total costs in that year divided by outstanding assets, and thus would be biased 
upward if mutual funds were expanding (as they were in 1998).  Thus we take the average front-end sales costs (1.8 
percent for the 44 percent of plans charging such costs), plus 12b-1 costs, and amortize over an assumed 10-year 
holding period, and add this 9 basis point charge to both stocks and long-term bonds.   We assume no administrative 
costs for company-owned stock.   
20 Topel and Ward (1992) and Samwick (1993) estimate the standard deviation of the permanent innovation in log 
earnings to be about 13 percent.   
 
 rates; these are presented using 1983 workers and DB plans in Table 2A, with all values in 1995 
dollars.  The first two columns present the mean, median, 10th percentile, 90th percentile, and 
standard deviation of pension benefits for actual workers with just a DB pension in the PPS 
assuming they continue working on their current jobs until age 62.  In 1983, these workers could 
expect mean benefits of $14,237 and median benefits of $9,440, with a benefit at the 10th 
percentile of $2,022.  Assigning randomly chosen 401(k) plans from 1995 for the same earnings 
and asset draws yields mean benefits of $25,983, median benefits of $11,004, and 10th percentile 
benefits of $1,521.  (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of each pair of distributions 
reject the null.)  When the 4.36 percent of 401(k) enrollees with zero contributions (and hence 
zero benefits) are included, the median falls to $9,950, still higher than median DB benefits in 
1983.  Although the identity of the workers at these various percentiles may differ across the two 
distributions, expected benefits  under the 401(k) plans are higher for nearly every probability 
level. The exception is at the 10th percentile; DB plans yield an annual payment of $2,022 while 
401(k) plans provide $1,521 (including the zero contributors reduced the 10th percentile benefit 
to $727).  A utility framework is considered in the benchmark analysis below to allow ranking of 
the 401(k) and DB distributions.     
The next two columns make the analogous comparison for the 26 percent of the sample 
in 1983 with combined DB and DC plans.  These workers may have a plan that has important 
attributes of each type of plan, or they may simply have two or more plans with at least one of 
each type.  We take a conservative approach by replacing both the DB and the DC plan with just 
 
 a single 401(k) plan.  Median benefits from the 401(k) plan alone are less than the benefits from 
the combined DB and DC plan ($15,108 versus $23,152). The final two columns of Table 2A 
compare the larger group of DC plans (of which 401(k) plans are a subset) from the 1983 PPS 
against 401(k) plans from 1995.  The higher median benefits for the 401(k) plans in 1995 suggest 
that typical defined contribution plans have become more generous since 1983.   
Table 2B performs the same counterfactual experiment as in Table 2A, now using the 
sample of plans from the PPS 1989.  Once again, for workers with only DB plans, mean benefits 
from 401(k) plans are substantially larger at $25,531 than are benefits from their original DB 
plans at $19,102.  However, median benefits are 10 percent lower for 401(k) plans ($11,274) 
compared to DB plans ($12,524).  (Including noncontributors in the sample reduces median 
benefits to $10,176, although the mean is still higher.)   As well, the 10th percentile pension is 
lower for the 1995 401(k) plan, $1,716 compared to $2,421.   
Unfortunately, the lack of a pension provider survey in the SCFs later than 1989 
precludes a direct comparison of 1995 401(k) plans with 1995 DB plans.  However, other 
evidence suggests that the characteristics of DB plans in 1995 were not substantially different 
from those in the 1989 sample (Gustman et al., 1998). If anything, the introduction of cash 
balance plans later in the 1990s has eroded the generosity of existing DB plans, at least for 
workers who remain in their job until age 62 (Clark and Schieber, 2002).  Thus, we view the 
1989 PPS sample of DB plans as reflecting the upper bound on the generosity of current DB 
plans.  Indeed, the 1983 sample of DB plans are probably more representative of pensions 
available at the dawn of the 401(k) era.  
Benchmark Comparisons 
 
 Table 3 presents the distribution of pension benefits for the benchmark individual.22  
Because real income is held constant over time, we can evaluate secular changes in the 
generosity of pension plans.  As noted by Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), DB plans in 1989 
were more generous than DB plans in 1983 along all points of the distribution, perhaps reflecting 
the retirement of the least generous DB plans during this period (e.g., Papke, 1999; Ippolito and 
Thompson, 2000).   
  In the counterfactual exercise, the 1989 DB plan provides a higher mean and median 
payment than the corresponding 1989 401(k) plan. However, by 1995 expected benefits from the 
401(k) plans provided higher retirement benefits at both the mean and median, although the 10th 
percentile is still below that for the 1989 DB plans.  Figure 1 shows the entire distribution of 
benefits in the two samples.  The distributions are very close until the medians, above which the 
401(k) plans show increasingly larger benefits.  The expected benefits from 401(k) plans have 
continued to grow through the latter 1990s, so that by 2001 even the 10th percentile from the 
401(k) plan is roughly equivalent to the corresponding percentile from the 1989 DB plans.  The 
secular growth in benefits reflects higher contribution rates and a shift away from the very low-
yield short-term bonds.  These results are robust to including the 4.36 percent of 401(k) enrollees 
with zero benefits.  Table 4 presents benchmark estimates for this larger group.  While in 1995, 
median and mean benefits are larger for 401(k) plans than for the 1989 DB plans, the gap 
between 10th percentile 401(k) and DB benefits have widened.   
To consider these differences in a unified framework, we use a utility-based comparison 
                                                 
22 To construct the benchmark worker, we begin with the average real income ($40,218) and age (42) of the 1983 
sample, and used the age-earnings profile to project average earnings back to age 31, resulting in initial earnings of 
$27,092 in constant 1995 dollars for each simulated earnings history.  We specify fulltime work of 2080 hours per 
year and voluntary contributions to DC plans of 5.68 percent, the sample mean.  We simulate earnings forward from 
age 31.  For the 1989 simulations, we maintain the same real earnings at age 31 (and earnings dynamics), but adjust 
nominal earnings to the 1989 price level ($19,500) and change the worker’s birth date to 1958 from 1952.  
 
 where we estimate the degree of relative risk aversion under which 401(k) plans would be 
preferred to the “DB Only” option.  To approximate the actual income the worker is likely to 
have, we add the pension benefits to the Social Security benefits the worker would receive under 
the same earnings profiles.  Using the 1995 401(k) plans that exclude zero contributors, we find 
that all workers with an Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion γ ≤ 6 would prefer the 
401(k) to the corresponding DB plans; the value is even higher in comparison to the 1983 DB 
plans.  The “lower bound” estimates that include 1995 401(k) noncontributors (with zero pension 
income), the indifference point is γ ≤ 2 (relative to the 1989 DB plans) and γ ≤ 4  (relative to the 
1983 DB plans).  Even when noncontributors are included in the sample, individuals with γ ≤ 7 
prefer the distribution of returns from the 2001 401(k) plans in comparison to 1989 DB plans.  
Most estimates of relative risk aversion are substantially below this value (see Halek and 
Eisenhauer, 2001).    In sum, these results suggest that 401(k) plans, particularly those observed 
in more recent years, are preferred to defined benefit plans for all but the most risk averse 
individuals.   
Additional Sensitivity Analysis 
Having established our main results regarding the comparison of “DB Only” and 401(k) 
plans, we further investigate the sensitivity of our results in the remaining columns of Table 4.  
The first is to lower equity returns by 2 percentage points (Column 3).  The returns on the 401(k) 
plans are reduced such that the average return is roughly equal to the corresponding DB plans, 
but the median benefit $12,081, or 8 percent below the DB plan benefit.  (The 10th percentile is 
largely unchanged.)  The second sensitivity test is with regard to administrative fees.  There is 
considerable variation across plans with regard to fees, with the largest and most efficient plans 
charging roughly 30 basis points.  Lower mutual fund fees have a substantial positive impact on 
 
 benefits, raising the median by 10 percent and the 10th percentile by 17 percent.  Finally, 
lowering the retirement age to 55 will take advantage of some of the early retirement provisions 
in DB plans, while reducing the length of time for investments to grow in 401(k) plans.  
Surprisingly, the reduction in median benefits is greater for the DB plans than for the 401(k) 
plans, a 51 percent decline ($13,151 to $6,431) for DB plans versus a 44 percent decline 
($13,942 to $7,861) for the 401(k) plans.  Similar changes are observed for other points in the 
distribution as well. 
Job Changes  
In our main comparisons, we assumed that workers were covered by the same pension 
from age 31 to 62.  The final retirement benefits of both DB plans and 401(k) plans can suffer if 
the worker changes jobs before retirement.  For DB plans, final average pay used to calculate 
retirement benefits when the worker is eventually eligible is the nominal wage when he left the 
firm.  This lack of indexation causes DB benefits to be backloaded—a disproportionate share of 
the retirement benefits for long career workers are accumulated in the years prior to the (early or 
normal) retirement age.  For 401(k) plans, the danger is not the backloading of benefits but the 
potential for spending pre-retirement lump sum distributions rather than rolling them over into 
other retirement or savings accounts. 
To assess the consequences of job turnover on eventual retirement income distributions, 
we consider the following question in the context of the benchmark simulations: what fraction of 
a worker’s 401(k) plan could be withdrawn upon job change and still leave the same median 
benefits as the typical DB plan?  To do this, we simulate the distribution of pension wealth for 
the benchmark worker in a variety of careers:  Long (ages 31 to 65), Late Start (42 to 65), Early 
 
 (31 to 42), Middle (42 to 53), and Late (53 to 65).23   Table 5 presents median pension wealth 
(not benefits) at the termination of the job for the samples of DB plans from 1983 and 1989 and 
the matched 401(k) plans from 1995.  For the DB plans, benefits are discounted back to the age 
at which the job ends using a 3 percent real interest rate.  For jobs that last from age 31 to 65, the 
median DB benefits are 67 and 82 percent of the 401(k) plans in 1983 and 1989, respectively.  
Thus, workers who enjoy a long career under the same pension could spend 18 percent of their 
balances immediately and still have enough to obtain the median annuity from the 1989 sample 
of DB plans.24  The comparison becomes more favorable for DB plans when the career starts 
later.  Compared to the 401(k) plans, median wealth is 4 percent higher in the 1989 DB sample 
for “Late Start” workers (age 42 to 65) and 13 percent lower in the 1983 DB sample.  
The comparisons become much less favorable for DB plans when the career ends before 
65.  For the Early Career job (age 31 to 42), the median DB wealth is just 31.3 percent of the 
median 401(k) balance, suggesting that the workers could spend about two-thirds of the 
distribution and not lose pace with the DB plans.  Similarly, for the Middle Career job (ages 42 
to 53), the median DB wealth is just 65.6 percent of the median 401(k) balance, allowing more 
than one-third of the lump sum distribution to be spent rather than saved.25  Factoring in the 31.3 
percent higher DB benefits for the Late Career job, and allowing the portion of lump sum 
distributions that are saved to compound at a real interest rate of 3 percent, a policy of saving 37 
percent of both pre-retirement distributions at the median would be sufficient to maintain parity 
                                                 
23 We allow the worker to remain employed for at least 10 years in each job to ensure that they do not run afoul of 
DB vesting restrictions in the 1983 survey.  Jobs that end before 5 years, the current vesting period, would lessen 
DB pensions even more. 
24 Retirees may face adverse selection in attempting to purchase annuities outside of a group, although Brown, 
Mitchell, and Poterba (2000) suggest that private annuity purchasers are receiving nearly fair market rates. 
25 Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998) report that the probability of reinvesting lump-sum distributions based on the 
1993 CPS rises steadily with age, from 48 percent for those age 35 to 44 to 73 percent for those age 55 to 64.  Also 
see Chang (1996), Engelhardt (2001), and Berman, Coe, and Gale (2001). 
 
 with the sequence of median benefits from the DB plans.  Note that comparing remaining 
pension benefits does not capture a critical difference between the hypothetical loss in 401(k) 
benefits and the loss of DB benefits: at least 401(k) enrollees buy something they want, rather 
than having it revert to employers as it does under DB plans.   
VI.  Are Workers Really Better Off Under DC Plans? 
One important limitation of our analysis is that we focus just on retirement benefits and 
not on the general equilibrium wage and saving effects that could occur as DC plans cover a 
larger fraction of workers.  A standard life cycle model would suggest that, aside from tax issues, 
the form of the pension plan is irrelevant to the worker’s retirement security.  What matters is the 
total compensation package of the worker, which includes both wages and fringe benefits.  Any 
changes in the pension plan can be neutralized by the appropriate adjustment to net wages and 
the non-pension wealth of the worker.  For example, a shift from a DB plan funded by the 
employer to a DC plan funded entirely by employee contributions has a first-order impact on the 
overall wage of the worker.  To keep compensation constant, employers would increase the gross 
wage by the amount they had previously contributed to the DB pension fund.  Thus our 
comparisons tend to be biased against DC plans, since increasing gross earnings along with 
randomly assigning a 401(k) plan would also increase simulated 401(k) benefits.   
However, suppose that employers understood that DC plans provided generally superior 
benefits to employees at retirement.  In this case, employers could respond by reducing wages 
while keeping the overall level of compensation (wages plus pensions) the same.   But for this 
effect to dominate the opposite bias noted above, it would have to be the case that DB plans yield 
lower retirement benefits than the 401(k) plans counting only employer contributions, something 
that we do not find in our (unreported) simulations. Thus, we argue that general equilibrium 
 
 effects would tend to be biased against 401(k) plans relative to DB plans.   
It could also be the case that workers are simply saving less in conventional saving 
accounts in response to the increase in 401(k) employee contributions.  In this case, there is a 
complete offset between taxable saving and tax-deferred saving, with little improvement in 
financial security at retirement.  While there is still some controversy regarding the impact of 
401(k) plans on higher income households, even the critics of 401(k) plans find a net positive 
impact on lower or middle-income contributors.26  
VII.  Conclusion 
The surprisingly rapid increase in the number of defined contribution pension plans raises 
an obvious question: will such plans provide adequate retirement income security compared to 
the previously dominant defined benefit plans?   We have addressed this question using a large 
sample of workers and detailed information on their pension plans from the Surveys of Consumer 
Finances from 1983 through 2001 along with simulated earnings and asset returns, including 
returns from company-owned stock.  Our results suggest that generally, 401(k) plans, 
particularly those provided in later years, are as good or better providing than DB plans in 
providing for retirement.  While benefits at the 10th percentile are generally lower among 401(k) 
plans, utility-based comparisons generally favor 401(k)s across a wide range of risk aversion 
parameters, particularly 401(k) plans from more recent years.  The intuition behind this result is 
that stock market returns are largely uncorrelated, so that over the worker’s employment career, 
low rates of return tend to be balanced by higher rates of return.  By contrast, defined benefit 
plans tied to the final years of earnings expose the worker to considerable earnings risk.  
These results would be strengthened in a more complex model where DB plans could 
                                                 
26 See Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996), Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996), Hubbard and Skinner (1996), Engen and 
Gale (2000), and Khitatrakun, Kitamura, and Scholz (2000). 
 
 reduce benefits ex post, for example with cash balance plans (Clark and Schieber, 2000) or 
because of default and government subsidies to pay existing DB claims.  The Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation, which insured DB pension plans, recently reported a $5.4 billion deficit, 
and the automobile industry pensions are reported underfunded by $60 billion (Kandarian, 2003).    
There are two important reasons why 401(k) plans may fall short of defined benefit plans.  
The first is inadequate (or zero) contribution rates.  While fewer than 5 percent of workers 
without defined benefit plans who are offered 401(k)s fail to contribute in any form, legislation 
that sets minimum contribution rates could improve retirement benefits substantially for the 
bottom decile of pension benefits (Samwick and Skinner, 1997).  Second, our sensitivity analysis 
has shown the importance of investment fees for administering 401(k) balances. Any advantages 
of 401(k) plans over DB plans can be largely eroded with the often very high load factors found 
in smaller 401(k) plans (USDOL, 1998a).  Still, despite the recent media outcry to the contrary, 
our results suggest that the trend toward 401(k) plans has strengthened the retirement security of 
current workers. 
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 Figure 1:  Cumulative Distribution of Defined Benefit 
and Matched 401(k) Plans 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Matched 401(k) Plan Samples, 1989 – 2001 
Characteristic 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
  
Workers with 401(k) Plans Only  
   Number of Observations 330 516 849 1,009 1,204
   Millions of Workers 8.17 11.90 19.09 23.47 27.75
  
Contributions to 401(k) Plans  
   Mean (median)  
   employee contribution 
 
5.28
(4.00)
5.55
(5.00)
5.99
(5.00)
6.46 
(5.65) 
6.65
(6.00)
   Mean (median)  
   employer contribution 
 
5.03
(3.00)
5.16
(4.00)
5.08
(4.00)
4.58 
(3.36) 
4.89
(4.00)
   Mean (median) 
   total contribution 
 
10.31
(9.00)
10.71
(9.00)
11.08
(10.00)
11.04 
(10.00) 
11.53
(10.00)
    Percent of workers with no 
    contributions 
 
* 4.67 4.36 4.04 2.72
Asset Allocation**  
   Mostly in Stocks 23.69 24.74 38.22 45.43 54.54
   Split Between Stocks and Bonds 36.79 39.92 41.23 37.94 34.13
   Mostly in Bonds 39.52 35.34 20.55 16.63 10.31
   
Notes:   
Source: Authors’ tabulations of the Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1989 – 2001. Contribution amounts to the 
401(k) plans are reported for the sample of workers who report positive total contributions. 
 
* Reported value of 0.02 percent which is almost surely the result of confusion regarding the question.  When 401(k) 
plans were relatively scarce, workers may not have been aware of their 401(k) plans unless they or their employers 
were actively contributing.   
 
** Possible answers to the asset allocation questions are: (a) Mostly or all stock; stock in company, (b) Mostly or all 
interest earning; guaranteed; cash; bank account, (c) Split between stock and interest earning assets, (d) Real estate, 
(e) Insurance / Retirement plan, (f) Other.  Responses (a) and (c) are imputed at 100 and 50 percent in equity, 
respectively.   All other responses are imputed at 0 percent in equity. 
 
 
  
Table 2A:  Counterfactual Pension Income Distributions 
1983 Pension Provider Survey 
 DB Only DB and DC DC Only 
 1983 
PPS 
1995 
401(k) 
1983 
PPS 
1995 
401(k) 
1983 
PPS 
1995 
401(k) 
Mean 
 
14,237 25,983 37,232 33,690 18,597 30,965 
Median 
 
9,440 11,004 23,152 15,108 7,220 11,648 
10th 
Percentile 
2,022 1,521 5,110 2,611 924 1,541 
90th 
Percentile 
31,055 58,891 75,739 73,032 40,385 72,560 
Standard 
Deviation 
15,789 60,208 79,321 70,973 49,276 71,785 
Obs. 22,365  10,052  6,426  
 
Table 2B: Counterfactual Pension Income Distributions 
1989 Pension Provider Survey 
 DB Only DB and DC DC Only 
 1989 
PPS 
1995 
401(k) 
1989 
PPS 
1995 
401(k) 
1989 
PPS 
1995 
401(k) 
Mean 
 
19,102 25,531 42,638 36,883 28,970 29,258 
Median 
 
12,524 11,274 26,356 16,284 10,581 12,004 
10th 
Percentile 
2,421 1,716 6,154 2,191 1,543 1,191 
90th 
Percentile 
44,014 57,952 90,072 81,411 57,252 68,233 
Standard 
Deviation 
20,700 61,565 61,427 83,435 86,319 65,463 
Obs. 13,409  12,131  14,260  
Notes:  
1) Source:  Authors’ tabulations of the Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1983 and 1989 – 2001, and the 
Pension Provider Surveys, 1983 and 1989. 
 
2) All amounts are in 1995 dollars and represent the level of constant, real annuities payable at retirement 
based on the actuarial present value of DB pension benefits or the balance in the DC pension or 401(k) 
account. 
 
3) The baseline assumptions assume a 13 percent standard deviation of the permanent shock to earnings each 
year, a 1.5 percent rate of annual productivity growth, and a retirement age of 62. 
 
4) Public sector workers are excluded from the sample in both 1983 and 1989. 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Benchmark Pension Income Distributions, Matched 401(k) Plans, 1989 – 2001 
 DB Only Plans from 
Pension Provider Surveys
Matched 401(k) Plans from 
Surveys of Consumer Finances 
 1983 1989 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 
Mean 
 
14,552 18,228 17,503 19,535 23,112 24,797 26,461 
Median 
 
10,681 13,151 10,633 12,136 13,942 15,113 16,338 
10th 
Percentile 
3,272 4,415 1,969 3,243 3,385 4,384 4,200 
90th 
Percentile 
29,831 38,628 37,395 41,181 49,793 52,519 56,510 
Std 
Deviation 
14,003 16,388 26,619 26,407 34,761 35,771 35,536 
1983 PPS sample, N = 22,512; 1989 PPS sample, N = 12,922.  See Notes to Table 2. 
 
 
  
Table 4: Benchmark Pension Income Distributions, Sensitivity Analysis 
 Base-Case  
(From Table 3) 401(k) Plans Changed to have: 
Retirement Age 
Lowered to 55 
 
1989 
DB Only 
 
1995 
401(k)  
 
4.36% 
Zero 
Balances 
2% Lower 
Equity return 
Admin.  
Fees 
Equal 
0.30% 
 
1989 
DB 
Only 
1995 
401(k) 
Mean 
 
18,228 23,112 22,294 18,436 25,081 9,187 11,599 
Median 
 
13,151 13,942 13,624 12,081 15,373 6,431 7,861 
10th Percentile 
 
4,415 3,385 2,518 3,227 3,950 1,899 2,268 
90th Percentile 
 
38,628 49,793 49,918 39,910 55,339 20,570 24,664 
Std Deviation 
 
16,388 34,761 30,471 22,076 33,159 8,307 12,817 
See Notes to Table 2.  
  
 
 Table 5:  Median Pension Wealth for Benchmark Worker with Interrupted Pension Coverage 
 
 
 
Median 
Wealth 
1983 DB 
Median 
Wealth 
1989 DB 
Median 
Wealth 
1995 401(k) 
Wealth 
Ratio 
1983/1995 
Wealth 
Ratio 
1989/1995 
Job Duration (1) (2) (3) (1)/(3) (2)/(3) 
Long Career 
  (31 –  65) 
386,162 473,492 574,844 0.672 0.824
Late Start 
  (42 – 65) 
286,926 343,448 330,828 0.867 1.038
Early Career 
  (31 – 42) 
12,157 17,609 56,252 0.216 0.313
Middle Career 
  (42 – 53) 
39,613 57,673 87,936 0.450 0.656
Late Career 
  (53 – 65) 
155,263 184,815 140,808 1.103 1.313
Notes:  
1) Source:  Authors’ tabulations of the Surveys of Consumer Finances, 1995, and the Pension Provider Surveys, 
1983 and 1989. 
 
2) All amounts are in 1995 dollars and represent the present value of pension benefits in the year the worker leaves 
the firm, discounted at a real interest rate of 3 percent. 
 
3) The baseline assumptions assume a 13 percent standard deviation of the permanent shock to earnings each year 
and a 1.5 percent rate of annual productivity growth. 
 
4) Public sector workers are excluded from the sample.  
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